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Note
Embracing Equity: A New Remedy for Wrongful
Health Insurance Denials
E. Daniel Robinson∗
Carmine Cicio was diagnosed with blood cancer in March
1997.1 His doctor tried chemotherapy first, but then decided
that a blood stem cell transplant was the most appropriate
treatment.2 The procedure was well-established, with better response rates than other treatments, and Mr. Cicio was a good
candidate.3 However, the doctor needed the approval of Mr.
Cicio’s insurer before beginning the treatment.4 Although the
insurer’s medical director had never seen Mr. Cicio, he nevertheless determined the stem cell transplant was not a suitable
treatment for him.5 Mr. Cicio’s doctor spent months trying to
convince the insurance company to reverse its decision.6 Finally, the medical director relented and admitted that the
treatment was right for Mr. Cicio.7 By then, however, it was too
late. Mr. Cicio died in May 1998.8
Mr. Cicio’s wife sued the insurance company and its medical director for multiple claims, including medical malpractice.9
The insurance company argued Ms. Cicio’s claims were pre∗ J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1992,
Rice University. The author wishes to thank the following people whose advice
and commentary helped shape this Note: Shaw Scott, David Leishman,
Stephen Befort, and Kate McKinnon. The author is especially grateful to his
wife Kelli for her selfless patience and generous support, without which this
Note would have been impossible. Copyright © 2006 by E. Daniel Robinson.
1. Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 86–87 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. Vytra Healthcare v. Cicio, 542 U.S. 933 (2004) (mem.).
2. Id. at 87–88.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 88.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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empted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA),10 which governs the administration of employee
benefit plans and provides remedies for violations.11 The U.S.
Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the insurer and remanded Ms. Cicio’s claims for reconsideration.12
The Court reached this result after holding in Aetna Health
Inc. v. Davila13 that claims against ERISA health insurers for
denial of benefits are preempted by ERISA, which has its own
“comprehensive remedial scheme.”14 So why is it that Ms. Cicio,
like the plaintiffs in Davila, did not amend her complaint to
take advantage of these ERISA remedies? It turns out that
courts and commentators—and plaintiffs’ lawyers—are nearly
unanimous in declaring there is no remedy for plaintiffs like
Ms. Cicio after Davila. As explained in Part I.C, this common
view holds that patients harmed by wrongful denials of health
insurance simply have no way of pursuing compensation for
their losses. Most commentators conclude that this situation
will continue until the Court overturns its precedents or Congress amends ERISA.
However, such patients may not need to look to Congress
for a solution. The Supreme Court will still allow relief under
ERISA if both the basis for the claim and the category of remedy were historically available in equity. Because of these demanding requirements, the Court will likely reject most proposed remedies for providing compensation under ERISA, such
as restitution, reinstatement, and make-whole relief for breach
of fiduciary duty.
Plaintiffs may find acceptable ERISA remedies, though, by
embracing the Court’s command to examine the practice of historical courts of equity. Surcharge is a remedy historically
granted by courts of equity for breaches of fiduciary duty.15 It
requires the fiduciary to compensate the victim for costs incurred, income lost, and gains foregone because of the breach.16

10. See id. at 89.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000).
12. Vytra Healthcare v. Cicio, 542 U.S. 933 (2004) (mem.).
13. 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
14. Id. at 217.
15. See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means By ‘Equitable’: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 1317, 1352 (2003).
16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 205, cmt. a (1992); see id. §§ 210,
211; see also F.J. Hanshaw Enters., Inc. v. Emerald River Dev., Inc., 244 F.3d
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This Note argues that surcharge for breach of fiduciary duty
fulfills the Court’s requirements for “equitable relief” under
ERISA and meets the objections the Court has raised to other
forms of compensatory relief.17
Part I of this Note describes ERISA remedies and the Supreme Court decisions that have constrained those remedies.
Part II argues that the Court has defined a two-part test for
equitable relief under ERISA and proposes that surcharge for
breach of fiduciary duty satisfies the Court’s test for equitable
relief, while other alternatives for providing monetary makewhole relief under ERISA do not. This Note concludes that surcharge for breach of fiduciary duty may provide a last chance at
compensation for victims of wrongful healthcare denials.
I. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE: LIMITED ERISA
REMEDIES PLUS TOTAL ERISA PREEMPTION
CREATE A REGULATORY VACUUM
ERISA provides three main remedies for employees with
complaints about their employer-provided benefits.18 Of these,
the remedy offering equitable relief for beneficiaries provides
the greatest potential for relief to victims of wrongful health insurance denials.19 However, the Court has narrowly construed
equitable relief to exclude most, if not all consequential damages.20 Moreover, patients cannot sue under common law or
state law causes of action because the Court has ruled that
ERISA preempts such claims.21 As a result, a “regulatory vac1128, 1142 (9th Cir. 2001).
17. The idea of surcharge as an ERISA remedy derives from Professor
Langbein; he argued that Justice Scalia was wrong in Mertens to assert that
damages were always a legal remedy and explained that Scalia may have been
confused because awards of compensatory relief in courts of equity were commonly called “surcharge” instead of “damages.” Langbein, supra note 15, at
1352–53. However, Langbein never argues that the Court would accept surcharge as an ERISA remedy. Instead, he argues that surcharge is simply a
synonym for damages. Id. If this were true, then as explained in Part II.A.1,
the Court would reject surcharge as an ERISA remedy because allowing it
would deprive the word “equitable” in ERISA of any limiting meaning. In contrast, this Note argues that surcharge is a distinctly equitable remedy, clearly
distinguished from legal damages, and that therefore it meets the Court’s requirements for an ERISA remedy.
18. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000).
19. See id. § 1132(a)(3).
20. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 204–21 (2004); see
also id. at 222–24 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
21. See id. at 222–24.
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uum” exists in which plaintiffs like Ms. Cicio have little opportunity for relief.22
A. REMEDIES PROVIDED BY ERISA
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 in response to a widely
publicized pension fund failure that left workers without funds
for retirement.23 With ERISA, Congress created a comprehensive scheme of federal regulation of employee pension plans, intending to protect workers from the risk of default or misadministration of their retirement plans.24 ERISA not only covers
pension plans, but also all employee benefit plans including
welfare benefit plans such as health insurance.25
ERISA draws from the law of trusts and “treats anyone as
a fiduciary to the extent that person exercises material discretion over the [employee benefit] plan.”26 ERISA also requires
that all such fiduciaries fulfill certain duties.27 Among its mandates, ERISA requires a fiduciary to “discharge his duties with
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries and . . . for the exclusive purpose of . . . providing
benefits to participants and their beneficiaries . . . [and] defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.”28
A beneficiary may pursue three types of civil remedies for
fiduciary violations of the Act’s requirements. First, a beneficiary may use an ERISA reimbursement action to sue to recover
benefits due or to enforce or clarify his or her rights under the
plan.29 This provision does not provide for compensating any
harm the beneficiary may have incurred as a consequence of
the benefit denial—it is limited to paying the benefits originally
denied.30 Second, ERISA allows a suit for “appropriate relief ”
for breach of fiduciary duty.31 Third, a beneficiary may also sue

22. Id. at 222.
23. See Langbein, supra note 15, at 1321–22.
24. Id. at 1322.
25. James W. Kim, Note, Managed Care Liability, ERISA Preemption,
and State ‘Right to Sue’ Legislation in Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 36 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 651, 655 (2005).
26. See Langbein, supra note 15, at 1324–25.
27. See id.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000).
29. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
30. See id.
31. Id. §§ 1132(a)(2), 1109.
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to obtain “other appropriate equitable relief.”32 The Supreme
Court could have construed the latter two remedies to allow
compensation for harm suffered by beneficiaries like Ms. Cicio.
Instead, in a series of decisions, the Court narrowly interpreted
these two provisions to strictly limit remedies for individuals
against the plan.
B. LIMITS ON ERISA REMEDIES
The Supreme Court has limited the ERISA provisions for
appropriate relief for breach of fiduciary duty and for other appropriate equitable relief through three decisions. In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, the Court ruled
that a suit for appropriate relief for breach of fiduciary duty
under ERISA authorizes payment of damages for a breach of
fiduciary duty only to the plan, not to the participant.33 Thus, a
plaintiff like Ms. Cicio cannot receive any compensation as appropriate relief under this provision. The Court also held that
this provision did not authorize compensatory or punitive damages, characterizing those damages as “extracontractual.”34
However, the Court explicitly left open the possibility that it
might authorize such damages under a separate provision providing for other appropriate equitable relief.35
Eight years later the Court appeared to foreclose this possibility in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates.36 In Mertens, the plaintiffs sought compensation for the actions of a pension plan that
resulted in beneficiaries receiving reduced benefits.37 The beneficiaries sued under ERISA’s provision for other appropriate
equitable relief.38 In writing for the 5–4 majority, Justice Scalia
held that the relief sought was not available because equitable
relief in the statute includes only relief “typically” available in
courts of equity before the merger of courts of law and equity.39
Scalia mentioned three categories of remedies that would qualify as equitable relief: injunctions, mandamus, and restitu-

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. § 1132(a)(3).
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985).
Id. at 144.
Id. at 139.
508 U.S. 248 (1993).
Id. at 251.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 256.
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tion.40 He specifically held that compensatory damages are not
an equitable remedy.41
Almost a decade later, the Court clarified its standard for
equitable relief in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v.
Knudson.42 In Great-West, an insurer sought restitution for
payments to a beneficiary after that beneficiary obtained a
judgment against a third party.43 To determine what constitutes equitable relief, Scalia, writing again for a 5–4 majority,
examined the types of remedies available in courts of equity before the merger of equity and law.44 Under this revised test, the
Court examined “standard current works such as Dobbs,
Palmer, Corbin, and the Restatements” to determine whether
the requested relief was “typically available in equity.”45 Scalia
found that an action for restitution was only equitable if the
plaintiff sought money or property that could “clearly be traced
to particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession.”46
Thus, restitution that imposes liability is legal, while restitution that seeks to restore particular property is equitable.47 Importantly, the Court limited this distinction to actions seeking
restitution.48
These three decisions have almost completely foreclosed
compensatory relief for beneficiaries under ERISA. Russell precluded compensation for beneficiaries in suits for appropriate
relief for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.49 Mertens and
Great-West then excluded compensatory damages in suits for
other appropriate equitable relief and limited such relief to
categories of relief typically available in equity.50
This unavailability of compensatory damages makes
ERISA remedies “almost entirely illusory” for victims of wrongful healthcare denials.51 The Court recommends that patients
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
43. Id. at 208.
44. Id. at 212.
45. Id. at 217.
46. Id. at 213.
47. See id.
48. See id. Indeed, the Court distinguished Mertens, which involved an
action for damages for breach of fiduciary duty, as opposed to restitution. Id.
at 215.
49. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985).
50. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993).
51. DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 459 (3d Cir. 2003)
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“pa[y] for the treatment themselves and then [seek] reimbursement through [an ERISA § 1132(a)(1)(B) reimbursement
action], or [seek] a preliminary injunction.”52 But injunctive relief is only practical if the patient can delay treatment until the
resolution of the lawsuit. Reimbursement similarly provides no
relief for patients like Mr. Cicio who forgo treatment that is too
expensive to pay out-of-pocket. Even if a patient can wait for an
injunction or pay the high price of treatment, without the possibility of contingency fees, the plaintiff would have to pay for
the lawsuit.53 As one court remarked, “Enacted to safeguard
the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, ERISA has
evolved into a shield of immunity that protects health insurers
. . . and other managed care entities from potential liability for
the consequences of their wrongful denial of health benefits.”54
Thus, beneficiaries like Ms. Cicio are effectively without relief from ERISA. In theory, this absence of federal remedies
still would not bar a suit by Ms. Cicio under state statutes or
the common law. Unfortunately, the Court has also cut off
those avenues of relief.
C. THE COURT ELIMINATED NON-ERISA REMEDIES
In addition to limiting ERISA remedies, the Court expanded ERISA’s preemptive force to preclude almost all other
avenues for relief. This has resulted in what Justice Ginsburg
has termed a “regulatory vacuum,”55 where “[v]irtually all state
law remedies are preempted but very few federal substitutes
are provided.”56 In Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, a unanimous
Court held that ERISA completely preempts state law actions
brought to remedy the denial of benefits under ERISA health
plans.57 Not only state patients’ rights statutes, such as the one
relied upon by the Davila plaintiffs, but also common law actions including breach of contract, wrongful death, and mal-

(Becker, J., concurring).
52. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 211 (2004).
53. DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 459 (Becker, J., concurring). Indeed, Becker argues that the current system provides strong financial incentives for health
plans to cheat their customers with impunity. Id.
54. Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 53 (D. Mass.
1997).
55. Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
56. Id. (quoting DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 456 (Becker, J., concurring)).
57. Id. at 213–14 (majority opinion).
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practice are now unavailable to injured plaintiffs.58 For instance, Ms. Cicio could not sue her insurer for breaching its
contract to pay for care for her husband; nor could she sue her
insurer for breaching its common law duty of care in negligence
or malpractice; nor could she sue under any state statute—
ERISA preempts all such remedies.59
Ginsburg urged Congress to amend ERISA to fill this vacuum, but she also pointed to another possible approach to obtaining “make-whole” relief for beneficiaries.60 She suggested
that since Mertens’s limitations on consequential damages dealt
only with nonfiduciaries, ERISA, “as currently written and interpreted,” might allow “‘make-whole’ relief against a breaching
fiduciary in light of the general availability of such relief in equity at the time of the divided bench.”61
Numerous courts and commentators echo Ginsburg’s call
for congressional action to fill this “gaping wound” and provide
some remedy for wrongful health insurance benefit denials.62

58. One judge notes that breach of contract predates the Magna Carta,
has been strictly enforced by courts since then until preempted by ERISA, and
is the “very bedrock of our notion of individual autonomy and property rights
. . . . Our entire capitalist structure depends on it.” Andrews-Clarke, 984 F.
Supp. at 52–53.
59. In contrast, ERISA does not preclude a medical malpractice claim
against a medical provider, or a mixed treatment and coverage claim against a
plan that employs a treating physician, but does preclude claims against insurers for benefit decisions. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000).
60. Davila, 542 U.S. at 223 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
61. Id. (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 27–28 n.13, Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004)
(No. 02-1845), 2004 WL 121584).
62. Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (referring to the majority opinion as an “injury that the courts have done
to ERISA [that] will not be healed until the Supreme Court reconsiders the
existence of consequential damages under the statute, or Congress revisits the
law to the same end”), vacated sub nom. Vytra Healthcare v. Cicio, 542 U.S.
933 (2004) (mem.); see, e.g., DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442,
453 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring) (urging that “Congress and the Supreme Court revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA regime”); Andrews-Clarke, 984 F. Supp. at 53 (“This case, thus, becomes yet another illustration of the glaring need for Congress to amend ERISA to account
for the changing realities of the modern health care system.”); Kim, supra note
25, at 701–02 (calling for a federal Patients’ Bill of Rights in response to
Davila); Linda Peeno et al., A Wrong Without a Remedy, TRIAL, Sept. 2005, at
60, 67 (“After Davila, consumer advocates, health care analysts, and even federal judges are looking to Congress to correct the disparity of rights—either
through elimination or overhaul of ERISA’s effects.”).
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Many also call for the Supreme Court to overrule Mertens’s
limitations on “appropriate equitable relief.”63 Indeed, many
conclude the Court now limits monetary relief for wrongful
healthcare denials to payment for benefits due.64 However,
these commentators have ignored the possibility raised in
Ginsburg’s Davila concurrence: these patients may be able to
obtain meaningful relief without overruling previous Supreme
Court precedent and without congressional action.
II. FINDING MAKE-WHOLE RELIEF IN THE VACUUM BY
EMBRACING EQUITABLE REMEDIES AND CLAIMS
The surcharge remedy, coupled with a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty, may offer relief under ERISA for some of the
harm caused by the wrongful denial of medical care. The current Supreme Court test for equitable relief under ERISA is
satisfied only if the cause of action and the category of remedy
were typically available in courts of equity. A plaintiff can meet
both prongs of this test by requesting the remedy of surcharge
for a claim of breach of fiduciary duty. Although surcharge may
seem like an obsolete historical remedy, such a remedy is precisely what the Court requires in declaring that it intends to
revive the “obsolete distinction” between equity and law.65 Indeed, unlike other proposals for make-whole relief under
ERISA, surcharge is clearly distinguished from historically legal damages and gives the Court exactly what it demands: a
remedy that undeniably conforms to the “ancient classification”
of equitable relief.66
A. THE TEST FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF IN ERISA
The Supreme Court has defined two prongs of the test for
equitable relief under ERISA. First, the plaintiffs must seek a
remedy typically granted by courts of equity.67 Second, they
must bring a claim that could have been brought in courts of

63. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 15, at 1364; DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 453;
Cicio, 321 F.3d at 106 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
64. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 25, at 652–53 (claiming that relief now is
limited to the cost of the health services denied); Peeno, supra note 62, at 62.
65. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 216–17
(2002).
66. Id.
67. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 257 (1993).
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equity.68 Monetary relief is still available as long as it satisfies
the two prongs of this test.
1. Mertens Requires a Historically Equitable Category of
Remedy
The Court laid out the “remedy” prong of its test in
Mertens, holding that relief is only equitable for purposes of
ERISA if it is one of the “categories of relief that were typically
available in equity,” as distinguished from legal relief sometimes available in equitable actions.69 For instance, in Mertens,
Scalia, writing for the majority, acknowledged that because
ERISA is rooted in the law of trusts, equitable relief could
mean all relief available for breach of trust in courts of equity.70
However, he reasoned that such an interpretation must be
wrong because it would rob the phrase “equitable relief” of any
limiting meaning—allowing any type of relief.71 Instead, he defined the phrase to refer to “categories of relief typically available in equity.”72 Thus, the focus of the Mertens test is on the
category of remedy as distinguished from the type of claim. Just
because a claim could have been brought in a court of equity
does not make any relief granted for that claim equitable relief.73
In Great-West, Scalia reiterated this point in rejecting an
argument that “the common law of trusts provides petitioners
with equitable remedies that allow them to bring this action
under [ERISA]” because “a trustee could bring a [similar suit in
equity].”74 He cited Mertens to reemphasize that the category of
remedy must be equitable, regardless of whether courts of equity would have entertained a similar action.75

68. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 215 (quoting Reich v. Continental Cas. Co., 33
F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1994)).
69. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256.
70. Id. at 257.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 256.
73. Id. at 256–57.
74. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 219
(2002).
75. Id. Professor Langbein argues that the Court’s limitations on equitable relief adhere neither to the historical understanding of the term nor to
Congress’s intent in using the term in ERISA. Langbein, supra note 15, at
1328–31. He refers to Scalia’s argument as “internally incoherent.” Id. at
1352. He argues that Congress intended to include the full range of trust
remedies in ERISA. Id. at 1319, 1331. However, as explained in this Part, the
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In order to prove that a remedy is historically equitable,
plaintiffs must show that it is clearly distinguished from legal
remedies. In Mertens, Scalia argued that the remedy requested
by the petitioners, although characterized as equitable, was in
reality nothing other than a claim for compensatory damages—
a legal, not equitable remedy.76 The dissent argued the term
equitable relief still restricted the scope of remedies, even if it
embraced compensatory relief, because it excluded punitive
damages, which were unavailable in equity.77 Scalia responded
that punitive damages were sometimes available in courts of
equity. Thus, according to him, if courts defined “equitable relief” as “all relief available in courts of equity,” that definition
would include punitive damages and would not limit equitable
relief at all.78 Therefore, in the Court’s scheme, only remedies
which provide something less than legal damages are truly distinguished from legal damages and qualify as equitable.
2. Great-West Requires a Typically Equitable Basis for the
Claim
The second prong of the test for equitable relief under
ERISA examines the basis for the claim. In Great-West, Scalia
emphasized that a remedy is only equitable for purposes of ERISA if it is “commonly ordered in equity cases” and excludes
remedies only “occasionally awarded in equity cases.”79 Ginsburg’s dissent focuses only on the Mertens prong, characterizing
the test as a question only of the “substance of the relief requested.”80 In response, Scalia argues that it is not only a question of the substance of the relief, but also the “basis for [the]
claim” that is important.81 For example, Scalia explains that an
equity court would never grant “an injunction against [a] failure to pay a simple indebtedness.”82 The sources he cites for

standard in these cases is internally consistent if understood as examining
both the category of remedy and the type of action to narrowly define the term
“equitable remedy.”
76. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255.
77. Id. at 270 (White, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 259 n.7 (majority opinion).
79. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 215 (quoting Reich v. Continental Cas. Co., 33
F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1994)) (first emphasis added).
80. Id. at 228 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 213 (majority opinion).
82. Id. at 216; see also id. at 210–11.
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this proposition83 explain that a court of equity would not grant
such an injunction because it would not have jurisdiction over
the case.84 Thus the question is one of equitable jurisdiction
over the case, rather than type of remedy.
Although Great-West considered the type of claim, it did
not abandon the test for an equitable category of remedy.85 The
Court now requires both prongs for equitable relief under
ERISA. As Scalia noted, this is similar to the test courts use to
determine the meaning of “equitable” for purposes of the Seventh Amendment’s right to jury trial “[i]n suits at common
law,”86 as opposed to suits at equity.87 In such cases, the Supreme Court also applies a two-prong test: “First, we compare
the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the
courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and
equity . . . . Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature.”88 Indeed, in
Great-West, Scalia affirmed that the inquiry for determining
equitable relief under ERISA should be similar to that used in
Seventh Amendment contexts.89
3. Monetary Relief Not Precluded
The Mertens Court held the relief claimed was not equitable in part because “[m]oney damages are, of course, the classic
form of legal relief.”90 The Court reiterated this point in GreatWest, stating that “[a]lmost invariably . . . suits seeking . . . to
compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff are
suits for ‘money damages,’ as that phrase has traditionally
been applied, since they seek no more than compensation for
loss resulting from the defendant’s breach of legal duty.”91
Many courts and commentators read this passage to preclude

83. Id. at 210–11.
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 cmt. a (1981) (explaining that the availability of equitable injunctive relief for failure to perform a
contractual duty was historically viewed as a matter of jurisdiction, determined by the adequacy of legal damages).
85. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 219.
86. Id. at 217 (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 (1974)).
87. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987).
88. Id. at 417–18.
89. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 217.
90. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993).
91. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210.
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monetary claims from equitable relief under ERISA.92
However, courts routinely award monetary relief under
ERISA’s other appropriate equitable relief provision while
avoiding characterizing such awards as “damages.” For instance, plaintiffs commonly win past due monetary benefits
under this section.93 Courts often award interest on those past
due benefits94 and have sometimes awarded attorneys fees under this same provision.95 As the Tenth Circuit reasons, “[a]fter
all, any equitable relief, including those forms explicated by the
Court as available under [this section], must involve the direct
or indirect transfer of money.”96 Indeed, Mertens explicitly authorizes monetary relief, at least in the form of restitution.97
4. Equitable Relief under ERISA Is Not Limited to
Injunctions, Mandamus, and Restitution
In Mertens, Justice Scalia declares that equitable relief as
used in ERISA refers to “those categories of relief that were
typically available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus,
and restitution, but not compensatory damages).”98 From this,
some have concluded the Court will only allow injunction,
mandamus, and restitution as equitable relief.99 Professor

92. See, e.g., DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 459 (3d Cir.
2003) (declaring that Mertens limited relief to “injunctions, mandamus, and
restitution, but not monetary damages”); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat’l Health Plan of
Kan. City, 999 F.2d 298, 304–05 (8th Cir. 1993) (excluding a claim for relief
because it involves monetary relief); Hartman v. Wilkes-Barre Gen. Hosp., 237
F. Supp. 2d 552, 557 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (interpreting Great-West to preclude any
claims for “money due and owing”); Langbein, supra note 15, at 1350; Kelly M.
Loud, Comment, ERISA Preemption and Patients’ Rights in the Wake of Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1039, 1067 (2005).
93. See, e.g., Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Assocs. Health and Welfare
Plan v. Willard, 393 F.3d 1119, 1125 (10th Cir. 2004); Howe v. Varity Corp., 36
F.3d 746, 756 (8th Cir. 1994), aff ’d, 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
94. See, e.g., Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 196 (3d
Cir. 2004) (reaffirming that interest is available as an equitable remedy under
§ 502(a)(3) after Great-West); Dunnigan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277 F.3d
223, 253 (2d Cir. 2002); Clair v. Harris Trust & Savs. Bank, 190 F.3d 495,
498–99 (7th Cir. 1999); Fotta v. Trs. of the United Mine Workers, 165 F.3d
209, 213 (3d Cir.1998).
95. See, e.g., Gorman v. Carpenters’ & Millwrights’ Health Benefit Trust
Fund, 410 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 2005).
96. Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Assocs. Health and Welfare Plan, 393
F.3d at 1125.
97. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 459 (3d Cir.
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Langbein goes further, explaining that mandamus was not historically equitable, that injunction is explicitly allowed in
ERISA separately from equitable relief, and that Great-West allows restitution only when there is a constructive trust. Therefore, he concludes, the only equitable relief now allowed under
ERISA is that available through a constructive trust.100
However, the plain words of the Mertens opinion do not support
this constrictive reading. If Scalia had meant to limit relief to
only those three categories, he is unlikely to have authorized
“categories of relief . . . such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution.”101 Indeed, lower courts have awarded other categories
of relief since Great-West.102
Thus, for a plaintiff like Ms. Cicio to receive compensation
for the losses caused by the insurer, she must sue for equitable
relief under ERISA because the Act preempts all other forms of
relief and because other ERISA remedies do not offer compensatory relief. The Supreme Court will only accept her suit if the
basis of her claim is historically equitable and if she requests a
remedy that was typically available in courts of equity. She can
request a monetary remedy, and her choice of remedy is not
limited to injunction, mandamus and restitution. The key remaining issue is whether such a remedy, which can provide
compensation for her loss, exists.
B. OTHER PROPOSALS DO NOT MEET THE COURT’S DEFINITION
OF EQUITABLE RELIEF
Lower courts and commentators have proposed solutions
for awarding relief for consequential harms under ERISA by
characterizing the relief in equitable terms such as restitution,
reinstatement, or make-whole equitable relief. As explained be-

2003) (declaring that Mertens limited relief to “injunctions, mandamus, and
restitution, but not monetary damages”); Langbein, supra note 15, at 1351–53,
1360.
100. Langbein, supra note 15, at 1360. Langbein uses this analysis to show
the absurdity of the limitations the Court has placed on the definition of “equitable remedies,” and the likelihood that such limitations were not intended by
Congress. Id.
101. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256 (emphasis added).
102. See, e.g., Mathews v. Chevron Corp., 362 F.3d 1172, 1186 (9th Cir.
2004) (awarding make-whole relief as “reinstatement”); Dunnigan v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 277 F.3d 223, 253 (2d Cir. 2002) (awarding interest as makewhole equitable relief); Clair v. Harris Trust & Savs. Bank, 190 F.3d 495, 498–
99 (7th Cir. 1999) (same); Fotta v. Trs. of the United Mine Workers, 165 F.3d
209, 213 (3d Cir. 1998) (same).
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low, such solutions are unlikely to meet current Supreme Court
requirements for equitable relief under ERISA because the
Court demands that the relief be equitable in substance, not
merely in name. In contrast, surcharge for breach of fiduciary
duty is substantively distinct from legal damages and is the
best chance for make-whole relief for beneficiaries harmed by
ERISA plan violations.
1. Restitution Fails the Category of Remedy Test in Suits for
Wrongful Benefit Denial
Some courts have granted relief beyond mere benefits due
as restitution. For example, the Seventh Circuit has awarded
restitution of medical costs as relief for breach of fiduciary duty
against a health insurance plan that wrongfully denied coverage.103 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Howe v. Varity called it
“equitable restitution” when it awarded reinstatement into a
benefits plan and the payment of lost benefits.104 However, this
theory of relief is unlikely to qualify as equitable relief under
ERISA after Great-West because it does not satisfy the remedy
prong of the test. Great-West held that restitution is not a historically equitable category of relief unless “money or property
identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff could
clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession.”105 Therefore, awards of reinstatement into a
benefit plan, costs incurred due to a breach of fiduciary duty, or
even benefits foregone as the result of such a breach are not
historically equitable restitution because they do not seek to recover funds in the plan’s possession. The Second Circuit
reached the same conclusion in determining that restitution of
medical costs such as that awarded by the Seventh Circuit is
not equitable relief in light of Great-West.106

103. Bowerman v. Wal-Mart Stores, 226 F.3d 574, 592 (7th Cir. 2000).
104. Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 756–57 (8th Cir. 1994), aff 'd, 516
U.S. 489 (1996). The Supreme Court affirmed Varity but did not discuss the
remedies issue. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 495 (1996).
105. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213
(2002); see also David D. Leishman, Note, Adding Insult to Injury: ERISA,
Knudson, and the Error of the Possession Theory, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1214,
1231–32 (2005).
106. Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 339–40 (2d Cir. 2005). The Seventh
Circuit in Bowerman relied partially on Strom v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 202
F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1999). Bowerman, 226 F.3d at 592. Strom was abrogated by
the Second Circuit in Pereira, because the Second Circuit recognized that restitution was only equitable after Great-West if it involved funds in the defen-
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The Tenth Circuit also applied this reasoning in refusing to
award a plaintiff the benefits she lost because of an ERISA life
insurance plan’s breach of duty.107 The court explained the
beneficiary could claim restitution for the amounts she had
paid in plan premiums, which would be directly traceable to
her, but not for the insurance benefit she would have received
absent the breach of duty.108
In the case of a health insurance denial, a court is also
likely to reject a claim for restitution of direct or consequential
losses. Like the life insurance beneficiary, a health insurance
beneficiary might seek benefits due under the plan. Even if the
beneficiary paid for health care out-of-pocket, those payments
would not be made to the plan, and so no funds possessed by
the plan would be “directly traceable” to the beneficiary.109
Courts have emphatically refused to grant restitution for profits derived through unjust enrichment when a health plan
wrongly denies a procedure.110 In a case like Ms. Cicio’s, where
a plaintiff forgoes care and seeks compensation for losses
caused by the health care denial, there is not even a monetary
expenditure for health care by the plaintiff for which to claim
restitution.111
2. Reinstatement Fails the Category of Remedy Test
Courts have attempted to circumvent Great-West’s apparent foreclosure of restitution for benefit denials by recasting the
same type of award as reinstatement. This theory is also
unlikely to satisfy the Supreme Court’s requirements for equitable relief under ERISA. In Mathews v. Chevron Corp., plan
administrators convinced the plaintiffs to forgo an opportunity
to participate in a pension plan.112 The Ninth Circuit granted
make-whole relief to the plaintiffs.113 The relief—all the benefits the plaintiffs would have received had they enrolled in the

dant’s possession. Pereira, 413 F.3d at 339–40.
107. Callery v. U.S. Life Ins. Co. in City of New York, 392 F.3d 401, 406
(10th Cir. 2004).
108. Id.
109. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213–14.
110. See, e.g., Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 150 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th
Cir. 1998).
111. Id.
112. Mathews v. Chevron Corp., 362 F.3d 1172, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 2004).
113. Id.
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plan from the start114—was identical to that granted in Varity.115 But unlike in Varity, and perhaps in response to the limitations on restitution after Great-West, the Ninth Circuit went
to great lengths to characterize the relief as “reinstatement”
and did not mention the term “restitution.”116
Furthermore, although the Ninth Circuit in a series of
cases cites the Supreme Court in Varity for the proposition that
reinstatement is “equitable, not compensatory relief,”117 none of
these cases cite any “standard current works”118 as required by
the Great-West test.119 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit is incorrect
to cite Varity for its assertion that such an award is equitable
relief because this issue was not before the Supreme Court in
Varity.120 The Supreme Court simply relied on the lower court’s
remedy determination, which characterized the remedy as restitution, not as reinstatement.121
Thus, reinstatement does not pass the first prong of the
test for equitable relief. Furthermore, even if it were an equitable remedy, it would be difficult to characterize make-whole relief for medical benefit denials as reinstatement. Unlike the defendants in Mathews and Varity, Ms. Cicio’s benefit plan did
not disenroll her, so she cannot be reinstated to the plan. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit explicitly distinguishes such claims
from reinstatement.122
3. Equitable Relief for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Fails the
Category of Remedy Test
The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) has argued that
ERISA allows make-whole equitable relief for breach of fiduciary duty, reasoning that any relief for breach of fiduciary duty

114. Id. at 1186.
115. Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 756 (8th Cir. 1994), aff 'd, 516 U.S.
489 (1996).
116. Mathews, 362 F.3d at 1186–87.
117. McLeod v. Or. Lithoprint Inc., 102 F.3d 376, 379 (9th Cir. 1996).
118. See Mathews, 362 F.3d at 1186–87; Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
150 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 1998); FMC Med. Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d 1258,
1261–62 (9th Cir. 1997); McLeod, 102 F.3d at 379.
119. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217
(2002).
120. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996).
121. Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 756–57 (8th Cir. 1994), aff 'd, 516
U.S. 489 (1996).
122. See Bast, 150 F.3d at 1011; Owens, 122 F.3d at 1261–62.
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is inherently equitable.123 Although no courts have adopted the
DOL’s approach to grant compensation for consequential losses,
three Circuits have awarded interest on benefits paid after a
delay that constituted a breach of fiduciary duty.124 Courts in
these cases have justified paying interest as equitable relief because it “make[s] the plaintiff whole.”125 In Dunnigan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance, the Second Circuit awarded interest on
past due benefits, explicitly stating that make-whole relief is an
appropriate equitable remedy for breach of fiduciary duty.126 In
that case, the court did not characterize the interest as restitution but only referred to it as an “equitable make-whole remedy” for the “unjust enrichment” of the defendants.127
This argument ignores the remedy prong of the test for equitable relief. The DOL argued that this test does not apply to
actions against fiduciaries because Mertens involved an action
against nonfiduciaries.128 As the DOL notes, the Supreme
Court initially stated the issue in Mertens as “whether a nonfiduciary who knowingly participates in the breach of a fiduciary
duty imposed by . . . ERISA . . . is liable [to the plan] for . . .
compensatory damages.”129 However, the Court based its holding not on the fiduciary status of the defendant but on the
meaning of the term “equitable relief,” concluding that it excluded compensatory damages regardless of whether they were
sought against a fiduciary or nonfiduciary.130 Furthermore,
123. See generally Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellants, Mathews v.
Chevron, 362 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-15936 & 02-16209), 2002 WL
32290814 [hereinafter Brief for the Secretary of Labor].
124. See, e.g., Dunnigan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 F.3d 223, 253 (2d Cir.
2002); Clair v. Harris Trust & Savs. Bank, 190 F.3d 495, 498–99 (7th Cir.
1999); Fotta v. Trs. of the United Mine Workers, 165 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir.
1998).
125. Dunnigan, 277 F.3d at 229.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Brief for the Secretary of Labor, supra note 123, at 9–10.
129. Id. at 9 (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 249–50
(1993)) (emphasis omitted).
130. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255–56; Langbein, supra note 15, at 1349–50.
Langbein notes that “to the astonishment of the ERISA bar, the Supreme
Court avoided deciding the question of nonfiduciary liability. The Court rested
its decision on the ground that even if there were such liability, section
502(a)(3) did not authorize the plaintiffs to recover consequential damages for
Hewitt's conduct.” Id.; see also McLeod v. Or. Lithoprint Inc., 102 F.3d 376,
378 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he status of the defendant, whether fiduciary or nonfiduciary, does not affect the question of whether damages constitute ‘appropri-
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while the DOL cites Mertens’s acknowledgment that “money
damages were available in . . . courts [of equity] against the
trustee,”131 it fails to note that the next passage repudiates the
DOL’s reasoning and mandates a focus on the type of relief
rather than the type of court.132
Moreover, the DOL’s argument fails to meet the command
to specify a particular category of relief that provides something
less than “all relief.”133 Instead, it argues for a blanket acceptance of make-whole relief just because the type of action—
breach of fiduciary duty—was historically equitable.134 In
Mertens, the Court rejected such a vague request for compensation as nothing other than a claim for compensatory damages—
a legal remedy.135 Because the DOL’s argument similarly requests equitable relief without defining any limits on that relief, Scalia is likely to reject that argument as allowing “any
type of relief at all.” Indeed, Scalia has explicitly ruled out the
DOL’s approach by rejecting any interpretation of equitable relief which would allow “all relief available for breach of
trust.”136 Thus, make-whole relief for breach of fiduciary duty,
like restitution and reinstatement, fails as a remedy under the
Supreme Court’s current ERISA jurisprudence.
C. SURCHARGE FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY COMPENSATES
VICTIMS OF HEALTH INSURANCE DENIALS AND SATISFIES THE
SUPREME COURT’S REQUIREMENTS
In light of the rejection of restitution, reinstatement, and
make-whole relief as ERISA remedies, plaintiffs like Ms. Cicio
may only find meaningful relief by embracing an ancient remedy from courts of equity. Surcharge provides monetary compensation for losses caused by a breach of fiduciary duty, and
thus could offer such relief. Moreover, it is a historically
ate equitable relief ’ . . . .” (quoting Armstrong v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 30
F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1994)).
131. Brief for the Secretary of Labor, supra note 123, at 10 (quoting
Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256).
132. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256.
133. Id.
134. See Brief for the Secretary of Labor, supra note 123, at 12. But cf.
McLeod, 102 F.3d at 378 (“[T]he status of the defendant, whether fiduciary or
nonfiduciary, does not affect the question of whether damages constitute ‘appropriate equitable relief ’ . . . .” (quoting Armstrong v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp.,
30 F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1994)).
135. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255.
136. Id. at 260.
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equitable remedy, and breach of fiduciary duty is a historically
equitable claim. Thus, surcharge for breach of fiduciary duty
satisfies both prongs of the Supreme Court’s test for equitable
relief under ERISA.
1. Surcharge: A Historically Equitable Remedy
Black’s Law Dictionary defines surcharge as “[t]he amount
that a court may charge a fiduciary that has breached its
duty.”137 Surcharge is levied on the trustee and paid directly to
the beneficiary to compensate for loss.138 This historical remedy
is the basis of the remedy still recognized by the Restatement of
Trusts for breach of fiduciary duty, “which make[s] the breaching trustee ‘chargeable with’ loss caused, profit made, or foregone profit.”139 Interestingly, while the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts does not refer to the term “surcharge” directly, the newest revision has revived the term. The Restatement (Third) of
Trusts explains: “If the breach of trust causes a loss, including
any failure to realize income, capital gain, or appreciation that
would have resulted from proper administration, the beneficiaries may surcharge the trustee for the amount necessary to
compensate fully for the consequences of the breach.”140
Courts award surcharge not only for lost income or gain,
but also for costs incurred by the beneficiary because of the
breach of fiduciary duty, including attorney fees.141 Although
surcharge has apparently never been claimed under ERISA, it
has been granted for breach of fiduciary duty against bankruptcy trustees,142 against partners interfering with the receivership of a partnership,143 and against trustees who have mismanaged trust assets.144 Bankruptcy trustees, like ERISA
benefit plans, are immune from actions by third parties arising
in the scope of their official duties, except for actions for breach
137. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1482 (8th ed. 2004).
138. See F.J. Hanshaw Enters., Inc. v. Emerald River Dev., Inc., 244 F.3d
1128, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2001).
139. Langbein, supra note 15, at 1353 n.208.
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 205, cmt. a (1992); see also id.
§§ 210, 211.
141. See, e.g., F.J. Hanshaw Enters., 244 F.3d at 1142 (awarding costs incurred due to an attempted bribe of a court-appointed receiver, including attorney fees).
142. See, e.g., In re Mailman Steam Carpet Cleaning Corp., 196 F.3d 1, 7
(1st Cir. 1999), cited in Langbein, supra note 15, at 1352 n.210.
143. See, e.g., F.J. Hanshaw Enters., 244 F.3d at 1142.
144. See, e.g., Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 272 (1951).

ROBINSON_3FMT

2006]

05/17/2006 09:13:57 AM

EMBRACING EQUITY

1467

of fiduciary duty—so tort remedies are excluded but historical
trust remedies are allowed.145 An award of monetary surcharge
compensating a beneficiary for consequential loss is a common
remedy for breach of fiduciary duty in these cases.146
2. Surcharge for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Satisfies the Test
for Equitable Relief Under ERISA
The Supreme Court holds that to give meaning to the term
“equitable” in ERISA, it is necessary to revive the “obsolete distinction” and “ancient classification” of equitable as distinguished from legal remedies.147 Thus, it should not be surprising that beneficiaries may only find meaningful relief under
ERISA by invoking surcharge—an ancient, nearly obsolete
remedy from the days of the divided bench.
As previously discussed, the remedy prong of the equitable
relief test requires a court to determine whether the “category
of relief was typically available in equity”148 using “standard
current works.”149 Surcharge was a historical trust law remedy,
as described in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts.150 It is also
cited with approval as a remedy for beneficiaries throughout
Bogert’s treatise on trusts,151 and is referenced in Scott’s treatise.152
The Supreme Court is likely to consider Bogert’s treatise
and Scott’s treatise authoritative “standard current works” for
purposes of the Great-West test. In fact, Great-West used these
same sources to interpret the scope of fiduciary duties under
ERISA in Varity,153 and in Mertens, the Court used both
sources to interpret ERISA in light of traditional trust law.154
145. See In re Mailman Steam Carpet Cleaning Corp., 196 F.3d at 7 n.4.
146. See, e.g., id.; Mosser, 341 U.S. at 272; F.J. Hanshaw Enters., 244 F.3d
at 1142.
147. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 216–17
(2002).
148. Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993).
149. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 217.
150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. a (1992); see also id.
§§ 210, 211.
151. See, e.g., GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 481 nn.34 & 82 (rev. 2d ed. Supp. 2005),
§ 541 nn.69 & 73 (rev. 2d ed. 1978), § 542 n.6 (rev. 2d ed. Supp. 2005).
152. 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS § 205, at 238–39 (4th ed. 1987).
153. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 502 (1996).
154. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 254, 256 (1993).
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Scalia’s opinions do not reference the Restatement of
Trusts, instead referring to the Restatements of Restitution
and of Contracts.155 However, the Court’s reliance on the law of
trusts for interpretation of ERISA156 and Scalia’s explicit approval of the use of Restatements, makes it likely he would approve of reliance on the Restatement of Trusts.157
Similarly, a trust-based remedy is appropriate for ERISA
actions because the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
ERISA encodes principles of trust law.158 Congress intended to
define ERISA duties and remedies to mirror trust law duties
and remedies.159 Indeed, Mertens bases its interpretation of
ERISA on trust law,160 and Davila relies on trust law to define
the scope of fiduciary duties.161 In Varity, the Supreme Court
declared that the law of trusts was the starting point for interpreting ERISA, although it would also consider text and congressional intent.162 In fact, in that case, the Court reached its
holding solely by relying on the law of trusts because it found
no compelling reason to deviate from those principles.163
Although Justice Scalia disapproves of some trust-based
remedies,164 his objections do not apply to surcharge. In GreatWest, Scalia criticizes a U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) brief
that analogizes the relief sought by the petitioner to one form of
equitable relief defined in the Restatement of Trusts.165 The
Restatement allows charging a beneficiary for amounts he or
she contractually owed to the trust but failed to pay.166 However, the Restatement remedy cited by the DOJ does not require the beneficiary to pay the money owed; rather, it only allows the trustee to collect the money due out of the
beneficiary’s interest in the trust.167 As Scalia points out, this is
155. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 211,
213 (2002).
156. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110–11 (1989).
157. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 217.
158. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 110–11.
159. Langbein, supra note 15, at 1324.
160. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 254 (1993).
161. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 219 (2004).
162. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496–97 (1996).
163. Id. at 506.
164. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 219–20
(2002).
165. Id.
166. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 252, 255 (1959)).
167. Id.
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in contrast to the relief sought in Great-West, where the petitioners wanted the beneficiaries to refund amounts owed out of
other funds not related to the trust.168 Because the equitable
remedy in the Restatement was not truly analogous to the relief sought by the plaintiffs, the Court refused to grant the relief.169
In contrast, surcharge is not merely analogous to, but is
the exact type of relief sought by beneficiaries harmed by
health care denials. Surcharge makes the fiduciary liable for
any “loss, including any failure to realize income, capital gain,
or appreciation that would have resulted from proper administration,” and authorizes “the amount necessary to compensate
fully for the consequences of the breach.”170 Indeed, in cases of
negligent or willful harm, the fiduciary may be personally liable to the beneficiary.171
Unlike a simple request for equitable relief to compensate
for loss, which Scalia characterized as “nothing other than
compensatory damages,”172 surcharge has substantive differences from damages. Surcharge provides only compensation for
financial loss,173 requires proof of a precise amount of loss,174
and generally requires bad faith.175 In contrast, tort damages
have a much larger scope—they often compensate for nonpecuniary losses.176 Also, the measure of tort damages is not based
on a precise accounting for loss like surcharge, but is based on
a fact finder’s reasonable estimation of what amount will compensate the plaintiff.177 Courts also award tort damages with-

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 205, cmt. a. (1992); see also id.
§§ 210, 211.
171. See In re Cochise Coll. Park, Inc. 703 F.2d 1339, 1357–58 n.26 (9th
Cir. 1983); In re E Z Feed Cube Co., 115 B.R. 684, 689 (Bankr. D. Or. 1990).
172. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993).
173. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. a.
174. See Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 220 F.2d 593, 612–13 (2d Cir.
1955).
175. See Sutliff v. Sutliff, 515 Pa. 393, 407–08 (1987) (refusing to grant surcharge against a parent/custodian who misused his child’s funds absent a
showing of bad faith); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. g (1959)
(explaining that a court in equity may refuse to grant surcharge when there is
no evidence of bad faith).
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 (1979) (stating that damages
may be rewarded for bodily harm and emotional distress).
177. Id. § 912 cmt. a.
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out a showing of bad faith. Thus, surcharge has more in common with equitable restitution, which Scalia approves as an
equitable remedy, than with damages.178
Scalia distinguishes equitable restitution from legal restitution because equitable restitution deals with a specific sum or
property transferred from the plaintiff to the defendant.179 Like
equitable restitution—and unlike damages—surcharge is based
on an exact accounting of the financial losses incurred by the
plaintiff.180 Moreover, both remedies require a finding of unfairness: equitable restitution requires unjust enrichment181
and surcharge requires bad faith misadministration.182
The fact that surcharge provides limited rather than all relief is key to its acceptance as an equitable remedy. In Mertens,
Justice Scalia rejected the proposed remedy, in part, because it
was not limited to something less than legal damages and thus
robbed the adjective “equitable” of any meaning in the phrase
“equitable relief.”183 In contrast, because surcharge is limited to
direct financial losses incurred by the plaintiffs, this remedy
distinguishes equitable relief from all relief. It excludes damages for nonepecuniary losses and losses incurred without bad
faith as well as punitive damages.
The claim prong of the test for equitable relief asks
whether the claim was historically available in equity. Relief
for breach of fiduciary duty was not only typically, but exclusively, available in courts of equity.184 The Dobbs treatise cited

178. Professor Langbein briefly mentions surcharge and describes it as precisely equivalent to legal damages. See Langbein, supra note 15, at 1352–53.
However, as explained in this section, there are important differences between
surcharge and damages.
179. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213
(2002).
180. See Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 220 F.2d 593, 612–13 (2d Cir.
1955).
181. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 229 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
182. See Sutliff v. Sutliff, 515 Pa. 393, 407–08 (1987) (refusing to grant surcharge against a parent/custodian who misused his child’s funds, absent a
showing of bad faith); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. g (1959)
(explaining that a court in equity may refuse to grant surcharge when there is
no evidence of bad faith).
183. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 259 n.7 (1993). For a discussion on this distinction, see infra Part II.A.1.
184. See Brief for the Secretary of Labor, supra note 123, at 2.
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by Scalia185 confirms that trust and fiduciary cases are historically and substantively equitable.186 In actions for breach of fiduciary duty, the Restatement explains that the law of trusts
“required the fiduciary to restore the beneficiary to ‘the position
in which he would have been if the trustee had not committed
the breach of trust.’”187 Furthermore, the Restatement (Third)
of Trusts specifically recommends the historically equitable
remedy of surcharge for this exclusively equitable action.188
Unlike the relief rejected by Scalia, surcharge for breach of
fiduciary duty is based on the law of equity. In Great-West,
Scalia argues that an injunction to pay money due on a contract
is not equitable relief because it derives from principles of contract law, which was in the domain of courts of law, not courts
of equity.189 In contrast, surcharge for breach of fiduciary duty
is equitable relief because the fiduciary duty derives from principles of equity.190
Finally, courts have determined that surcharge for breach
of fiduciary duty is equitable relief for purposes of the right to a
jury trial. In In re E Z Feed Cube Co.,191 the Bankruptcy Court
applied the Supreme Court’s two-part test to deny a jury trial
because the nature of the claim and the type of relief were both
historically equitable.192 In contrast, where the remedy for
breach of fiduciary duty was characterized merely as money
damages, the court granted a jury trial because the type of relief was legal.193
Surcharge for breach of fiduciary duty passes the Supreme
Court test for equitable relief under ERISA, because surcharge
is a historically equitable category of remedy and because
breach of fiduciary duty is a historically equitable claim. However, the question remains whether such a remedy would provide effective relief to plaintiffs like Ms. Cicio.
185. See, e.g., Great-West, 534 U.S. at 211 n.1 (citing 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW

OF REMEDIES § 1.2, at 11 (2d ed. 1993)).
186. DOBBS, supra note 185, §2.6(3), at

163.
187. Brief for the Secretary of Labor, supra note 123, at 12 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. a, at 458).
188. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. a (1992).
189. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213.
190. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. a; Langbein, supra
note 15, at 1352–53 (citing 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 205, at 238–39 (4th ed. 1987)).
191. 115 B.R. 684 (Bankr. D. Or. 1990).
192. Id. at 689.
193. See Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 340–41 (2d Cir. 2005).
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3. Surcharge for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Would Compensate
Victims of Wrongful Health Insurance Denials
Wrongful health insurance denials can constitute a breach
of fiduciary duty actionable under ERISA. ERISA defines a fiduciary to include anyone who “exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control” over the plan’s “management,”
“administration,” or “assets.”194 When a health insurer decides
what is medically appropriate treatment for a beneficiary, that
professional owes a fiduciary duty not to put the financial interests of the health insurance company over the best interests
of the plan beneficiary.195 In Davila, the Court held that a
medical insurance company in an ERISA plan is a fiduciary,
and the act of the company’s employee in denying benefits is a
fiduciary act.196 Indeed, courts routinely recognize that a
wrongful denial of health care benefits by an ERISA health insurance plan may constitute a breach of fiduciary duty for
which there is relief under ERISA’s other appropriate equitable
relief provision.197
Surcharge is an appropriate remedy for the type of breach
represented by wrongful health insurance denials. Wrongful
insurance denials are closely analogous to other claims for
which surcharge is granted, such as a misadministration of
trust funds. Both claims are based on a breach of trust by a fiduciary. Like a trust fund administrator, ERISA plans are required to administer the plan solely in the interest of beneficiaries.198 A misadministration of trust funds is actionable
because it results in lost income and costs to beneficiaries.
Similarly, a misadministration of an ERISA healthcare plan
194. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2000) (defining “fiduciary”).
195. See Bedrick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149, 154 (4th Cir. 1996); see
also Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 86–87 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. Vytra
Healthcare v. Cicio, 542 U.S. 933 (2004) (mem.). Furthermore, in this situation, the court need not apply the deferential “abuse of discretion” standard
that applies to most ERISA plan discretionary decisions, but may require an
“objectively reasonable” interpretation of plan terms such as “medical necessity.” See Bynum v. Cigna Healthcare of N.C., Inc., 287 F.3d 305, 311 (4th Cir.
2002). In some cases, this principle has even led courts to construe ambiguity
in a plan term against the insurance company. See Bailey v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Va., 67 F.3d 53, 57 (4th Cir. 1995).
196. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 219 (2004) (citing 2A supra
note 190, §§ 182, 183; GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 541 (rev. 2d ed. 1993)).
197. See, e.g., Bowerman v. Wal-Mart Stores, 226 F.3d 574, 590–92 (7th
Cir. 2000); Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 154.
198. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000).
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can result in lost income and costs to repair the damage. In
both cases, such losses may be payable as surcharge.
Although surcharge cannot compensate for nonpecuniary
losses, it would provide effective compensation for financial
losses incurred because of wrongful healthcare denials. Surcharge compensates the beneficiary of a trust for any financial
loss, “including any failure to realize income, capital gain, or
appreciation that would have resulted from proper administration,” caused by a breach of the fiduciary’s duty.199 A court will
grant surcharge only where the plaintiffs make a precise accounting of the financial loss.200 Some courts also require a
showing of bad faith.201 In a case like Ms. Cicio’s, she could
prove direct costs for intensive medical care and for the funeral.
She might also prove lost income. Because surcharge compensates only financial losses, she would not be able to receive
compensation for loss of consortium, emotional distress, or punitive damages. Ms. Cicio might also be able to prove bad faith
because of the insurer’s almost automatic denial of benefits and
disregard for the prevailing standard of care.202 Moreover, the
insurer had a profit interest in the decision to deny care. Although such an interest always exists, the plan cannot base
benefit decisions on a profit interest which is adverse to a beneficiary’s interest.203 If Ms. Cicio can show the insurer likely
acted on such an adverse interest, that would imply the insurer
made its admittedly incorrect medical decision in bad faith.204
Thus, surcharge would provide a meaningful remedy for her
under ERISA.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has painted victims of wrongful
healthcare denials into a corner, cutting off remedies available
199. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. a (1992); see also id.
§§ 210, 211.
200. See Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 220 F.2d 593, 612–13 (2d Cir.
1955).
201. See Sutliff v. Sutliff, 515 Pa. 393, 407–08 (1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. g (1992).
202. See Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 87–88 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom.
Vytra Healthcare v. Cicio, 542 U.S. 933 (2004) (mem.).
203. 29 U.S.C. § 1104.
204. See, e.g., Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 272 (1951) (finding that willfully setting up an interest adverse to the interests of the trust beneficiaries,
which is then acted on, is sufficient to support an award of surcharge even
when the beneficiaries have incurred no loss).

ROBINSON_3FMT

1474

05/17/2006 09:13:57 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:1447

under ERISA while construing ERISA to preempt all other
remedies. In doing so, the Court has left these patients with no
compensation for their loss. Most commentators have concluded
that the only way out of this corner is for the Court to erase its
precedents or for Congress to rewrite the statute.
Lower courts have fashioned remedies that provide some
compensation to these patients. Unfortunately, as this Note
demonstrates, those solutions are unlikely to meet the current
Supreme Court test for ERISA equitable relief. That test requires both a historically equitable claim and a historically equitable remedy that is clearly distinguished from legal remedies.
However, by embracing the Court’s revival of the ancient
classification between law and equity, plaintiffs can find appropriate ancient remedies that fulfill the Court’s requirements.
Surcharge, the historically equitable remedy for breach of fiduciary duty, meets the tests for equitable relief under ERISA
and is substantively distinguished from legal damages. Most
importantly, it offers a chance at compensation for victims of
wrongful health insurance denials.

